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THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED PREEMPTION:
HOW STATE LAW FRAUD-ON-THE-FDA CLAIMS
COMPLEMENT, RATHER THAN CONFLICT WITH,
FEDERAL LAW
HANNAH RODGERS*
ABSTRACT

Imagine an individual who visits his or her doctor after developing a hernia. The doctor
informs the individual of a new implant-or mesh-that involves minimally invasive surgery with very little healing time. Many individuals would not hesitate to accept this offer.
However, after the surgery, the individual experiences painful side effects and ultimately
must undergo subsequent surgeries to remove the defective implant. Following remedial
action, the individual files suit against the manufacturer of the implant-or rather the
manufacturerof the medical device-alleging multiple state common law claims for monetary compensation and punitive damages for pain and suffering. Whether courts will allow
such claims to survive is the focal point of this Note and the current circuit split regarding
the preemptive effect of the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.
While the Medical Device Amendments include an express preemption provision, allowing courts to maneuver within the limits of its possible interpretations, the question of
whether claims are impliedly preempted requires a much more technical and in-depth analysis from the courts. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee laid the framework for the
contours of implied conflict preemption, and how and to what extent implied preemption
may be invoked. Buckman held that "state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims" are impliedly
preempted by the Medical Device Amendments because, inter alia, such claims "inevitably
conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration's
judgment and objectives." However, this holding is susceptible to attack; state-law fraud-onthe-FDA claims should not be so readily held as preempted. These claims undoubtedly assist the FDA in policing fraud, and such claims should be available for injured plaintiffs
when medical device manufacturers fail to fully comply with FDA rules and regulations
duringpremarket approval or postmarket requirements.
This Note discusses the unfair and unjust applicationof implied preemption as applied
to state common law claims of fraud-on-the-FDA. Part I will examine the societal need that
prompted the creation of the Medical Device Amendments with respect to premarket approval of Class III medical devices. Part II will discuss the current state of the law, addressing
the Riegel, Lohr, and Buckman cases, as well as highlight the current split among circuits
with regard to implied conflict preemption. Part III proffers that state-law fraud-on-theFDA claims should ultimately survive preemption and become a readily available avenue
for injured plaintiffs to obtain recourse and hold manufacturers responsible for negligent
and/or intentional unlawful conduct. Finally, this Note concludes by reiterating the importance of state-tort law in the realm of medical device regulation; for without such common law avenues, medical device manufacturers would be on track to receive complete immunity from tort liability.
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INTRODUCTION

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads,
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively."' This amendment is particularly relevant because up
until the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the states held primary
authority for regulating and approving new medical devices.' The
birth of the MDA, 3 however, brought with it a new framework of
federal governance that unquestionably scaled back the authority
states once had and, arguably, infringed upon states' rights under
the Tenth Amendment. 4 With a new structure in place, states can
no longer guarantee, or even fully offer, the same protections they
once did with tort liability against manufacturers of medical devices. This is due, in part, to the fact that the MDA has an express
preemption provision,5 which significantly limits the claims a plaintiff may bring against a manufacturer of medical devices solely to
"parallel" state law claims. 6 The MDA also restricts state involve-

ment with the doctrine of implied conflict preemption.7
Implied preemption has become increasingly more operative within the field of state-tort lawsuits, barring common law claims where
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

2.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).

3. The Medical Device Amendments were enacted in 1976. They separated medical
devices into three classes-differentiating based on device descriptions, purposes, and the

accompanying regulations for each class. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2012).
4. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316, 333 ("The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 ...

as

construed by the Court, cut deeply into a domain historically occupied by state law.").

5.

21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012).

6.

A parallel claim is a state law that is "premised on a violation of FDA regulations."

See In re Medtronic Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th
Cir. 2010).
7. Conflict preemption is appropriately invoked when compliance with both state and
federal law is impossible, or when a state law or regulation "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." McClellan

v. I-Flow Corp., 776 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
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they once would have thrived.8 The holdings in Riegel and Buckman
significantly impact the scope of preemption by creating a "narrow
gap through which a plaintiffs state-law claim must fit if it is to escape express or implied preemption." While there is a long-standing
notion of the presumption against preemption-which "applies with
particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally
occupied by the [s]tates"' 0-this presumption, with regard to the
MDA and medical device manufacturers, currently seems tenuous at
best. Thus, the future of traditional state-tort common law claims is
at the mercy of the federal judiciary's analysis and interpretation of
the scope of the MDA; and as shown throughout this Note, there is
little consistency among courts as to how and to what extent preemption applies.

II.

THE BIRTH OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS

In 1976, Congress amended the FDCA to include the MDA." The
enactment of these amendments came about, in part, as a response to
rising concerns regarding the safety and efficacy of medical devices,
specifically the Dalkon Shield birth control device, 2 and also in part
due to the pressing need for uniform regulation, a user-friendly classifcation system, and overall consistency in approving safe and effective medical devices.13
The MDA set forth a three-part classification system to identify
the required standards each device must meet within each class. 4
The pertinent discussion for this Note is on Class III devices, which

8. See, e.g., Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1333 (11th Cir. 2017);
Loreto v. Procter & Gamble Co., 515 F. App'x 576, 579 (6th Cir. 2013); Martin v. Medtronic,
Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00994, 2017 WL 825410, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017); Frere v. Medtronic., Inc., No. 15-02338, 2016 WL 1533524, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2016).
9. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads, 623 F.3d at 1204.
10. McClellan, 776 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77
(2008)).
11. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
12. Carol
H.
Krismann,
Dalkon
Shield,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/science/Dalkon-Shield [https://perma.cc/2FQA-3M4Z] (noting
the Dalkon Shield was an intrauterine birth control device that was responsible for a "high
number of reported incidents of inflammatory pelvic infections, uterine perforations, and
spontaneous septic abortions," and further noting that four people died as a result of receiving such device); Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and
PremarketApproval Under the MedicalDevice Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 246
(2004).
13. Gail H. Javitt, I've Got You Under My Skin-And I Can't Get Redress: An Analysis
of Recent Case Law Addressing Preemptionof ManufacturerLiability for Class III Medical
Devices, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 553, 558-59 (1994).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2012); Javitt, supra note 13, at 559.
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require premarket approval because such devices are "purported or
represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or
for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or presents a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury."' 5 Class III medical devices receive "the most federal
oversight," and include devices such as replacement heart valves,
transvaginal surgical mesh, and pacemakers.' 6 Overall, while the
need for uniform and consistent federal regulation is necessary to
ensure that safe and effective medical devices are readily available to
consumers, the consequences imposed by the over-sweeping breadth
of the MDA have significantly affected individuals' ability to bring
state-tort common law claims against negligent manufacturers of
medical devices.
A.

PremarketApproval

Class III medical devices endure extensive review and require
premarket approval before they may be introduced into the market. 7
Each manufacturer that submits a device for premarket approval
must give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enough information to establish a "reasonable assurance" that each device is "both
safe and effective."" While premarket approval is deemed the gold
standard for device safety and efficacy-for example, the majority of
manufacturers undergo anywhere between nine and eighteen
months, or longer, of testing and research"-it is not the only mechanism for approval of these devices. The 510(k) approval process is an
alternative route for medical devices that "permits devices that are
'substantially equivalent' to pre-existing devices to avoid the [premarket approval] process."2 0 However, the 510(k) process-which was

15. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii).
16. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317 (2008).
17. Class III medical devices go through a rigorous premarket approval process; the
FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours reviewing each submission and determining the
safety and efficacy of each device. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
18. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477; see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, MEDICAL
DEVICES:
DEVICE APPROVALS,
DENIALS
AND
CLEARANCES
(March 26,
2018),

https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/deviceapprovalsandclea
rances/default.htm [https://perma.cc/XJ8Z-X3V3] ("A PMA is an application submitted to
[the] FDA to request approval to market. Unlike premarket notification, PMA approval is
to be based on a determination by [the] FDA that the PMA contains sufficient valid scientific evidence that provides reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective for its
intended use or uses.").
19. See Barry Sall, Regulation of Medical Devices, in MADAME CURIE BIOSCIENCE
DATABASE, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK6534/.
20. Id. at 478; see also § 360c(a)(1)(B).
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essentially meant to be an "exception" to the PMA process 2 1-has now
seemingly become the norm.2 2 While the 510(k) approval process is
much more lax than the full premarket approval process, and although Congress recognizes that time and resources are a major limiting factor for the FDA with respect to giving each device full premarket approval, this fact cannot overshadow the importance of consumer safety. Therefore, in order to maintain the 510(k) approval
process-and thus avoid the inevitable undue burden on the FDAthe FDA could actually enlist the states in a somewhat indirect way.
Specifically, the use of state-tort liability might aid the FDA in incentivizing manufacturers to adequately research and test their products to ensure they meet the safety and efficacy standards required
by the FDA, thus minimizing the potential of future tort lawsuits. 23
B.

Class III Medical Devices and Preemption

As stated above, Class III medical devices present "a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and are intended for life-saving or
life-sustaining human use. 2 4 States must adhere to certain federal
requirements that limit state regulations with respect to such medical devices. This arguably sparked controversy between the states
and the federal government because, as noted above, medical devices
were initially regulated by the states under the notion that "[s]tates
traditionally . . . had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons."25

21. Statement of Dr. David A. Kessler, former FDA Commissioner, in THE BLEEDING
EDGE (Netflix 2018); see also Alexandra Sifferlin, What the Netflix Documentary 'Bleeding
Edge' Gets Right About the Dangers of Medical Devices in America, TIME (July 27, 2018),
http://time.com/5346330/what-the-netflix-documentary-bleeding-edge-gets-right-about-thedangers-of-medical-devices-in-americal [https://perma.cc/7VR6-YSRA].
22. See Jon Kamp & Thomas Burton, How FDA Approved Hysterectomy Tools It Now
Disfavors; Regulator Didn't Study Morcellator's Cancer Risk Until 18 Years After Approving for Gynecology, WSJ (Dec. 16, 2014), https://search.proquest.com/wallstreetjournall
docview/1636345453/5D6F17B3199B4180PQ/1?accountid=4840 (finding that in 2013, the
510(k) process was used to approve over 99 percent of the approximately 3,000 new device
applications the FDA received in 2013).
23. See generally Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Note, Medical Devices and Preemption: A
Defense of ParallelClaims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196 (2011). While this Author defends the "parallel claim," as opposed to a
"fraud-on-the-FDA" claim, the analysis can be applied to both in certain contexts, such as
aiding the FDA in monitoring and redressing manufacturer malfeasance. See id. at 1226
("[P]arallel claims based on violations of industry-wide FDA regulations are potentially less
disruptive than fraud-on-the-agency claims."). However, as argued throughout this Note,
fraud-on-the-FDA claims may not be as "disruptive" as they are claimed to be.
24. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii).
25. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 756 (1985)); see also Kubicki v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 12-cv-734 (KBJ), 2018 WL
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Under the MDA, the federal requirements imposed on states are
as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter.2 6

The first provision-the express preemption provision"2 -has contributed heavily to the conflict among courts across the country
questioning whether state-tort common law claims can survive
summary judgment.2 8 While this provision is undoubtedly influential in shaping the preemption doctrine in this realm, the focus of
this Note is on implied conflict preemption.
As a whole, the doctrine of preemption finds its strength in the
principles set out in the Supremacy Clause of the United States

707428, at *37 (D.C.C. Feb. 5, 2018) ("[T]his [c]ourt concludes that the [plaintiffs] claims
against Medtronic that allege the negligent design, manufacture, and labeling of the

[device] exist independently of the FDCA, and in fact, are precisely the type of claims
that the Lohr Court anticipated would be allowed to proceed." (citing Schouest v. Medtronic, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 692, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ("[F]inding that state law fraud,
negligence, and breach of warranty claims relating to medical device were not impliedly
preempted where they 'would exist in a world without the FDCA.' "))).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012).
27. Express preemption occurs when Congress has explicitly spoken to whether the
federal statute's intent is to preempt the competing or conflicting state law. See Altria
Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
28. See, e.g., McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 776 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding
that "there is no suggestion that Congress intended to displace traditional tort law by
making all policing of medical labels and warnings the exclusive province of the FDA,"
and therefore holding that the plaintiffs state-tort claims were not preempted by the
MDA); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (ruling that the plaintiffs
state law claims were neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by the MDA); Gelber v.
Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the plaintiffs failure to
warn, failure to report, and negligence claims were preempted by the MDA); Ilarraza v.
Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that because the
plaintiff failed to allege any specific violation or noncompliance with FDA regulations
that related to the plaintiffs injury, her claims were preempted). Relatedly, prior to the
holding in Buckman, some courts held that the now called "state-law fraud-on-the-FDAclaim" was expressly preempted by the MDA. See Chadwell v. Optical Radiation Corp.,
902 F. Supp. 830, 835 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs claim of failing "to
make truthful disclosures of material fact to the FDA" was preempted); Kemp v. Pfizer
Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ("Plaintiff has alleged that defendants
engaged in a campaign of disinformation against the public and the FDA. Even if true,
plaintiffs state law claims are still preempted.").
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Constitution.2 9 The Supremacy Clause places significant importance
on the weight of federal law, and states have felt this pressure for
years .30 Of the two types of preemption, the pertinent discussion is on
implied conflict preemption. Conflict preemption results from the
"operation of the Supremacy Clause when federal and state law actually conflict, even when Congress says nothing about it." 3 1 Further,
conflict preemption "exists when 'the state law makes it either impossible to follow the federal law or provides a significant obstacle to
adhering to the federal law.' "32 One thing to note though with implied conflict preemption is that courts should "begin with the assumption that a state law is valid and should be reluctant to resort to
the Supremacy Clause." 3 3 As courts have shown, however, this assertion is not necessarily followed.
Moreover, notwithstanding the "narrow gap" plaintiffs must maneuver to get through the MDA's express preemption provision, 3 4 the
long-standing notion of a presumption against preemption, with respect to traditional state-regulated domains, is currently being called
into question. 35 While the Supreme Court's jurisprudence seems
somewhat hesitant when tasked with applying this presumption, 3 6 it
29.

J. David Prince, The Puzzle of ParallelClaims, Preemption, and Pleading the ParMITCHELL L. REV. 1034, 1037-38 (2013). The Supremacy Clause states,
"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
30. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (holding that due to
the federal government's long-standing history of regulating immigration within the United States, Arizona's additional state laws, though similar in nature, undermine the goals
and objectives of federal immigration law and are thus preempted); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625-26 (2011) (holding that plaintiffs state-tort claims were preempted
because it would be impossible for the drug manufacturer to comply with both state and
federal law, which undermines the federal objectives of regulating pharmaceutical drugs).
31. South Dakota R.R. Auth. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d
919, 927 (D.S.D. 2003).
32. Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00994, 2017 WL 825410, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 24, 2017) (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
33. Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
34. See Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009) ("Riegel and
Buckman create a narrow gap through which a plaintiffs state-law claim must fit if it is to
escape express or implied preemption.").
35. See Herron v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1047-48 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
(noting the presumption against preemption, but nevertheless holding that the plaintiffs
state law claims were either expressly or impliedly preempted due to the presumption of
Congress' intent); see also Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding the plaintiff's claims preempted, but never mentioning this presumption). But see Medtronic, Inc., v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our
federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt statelaw causes of action.").
36. See Mary J. Davis, The 'New" PresumptionAgainst Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
1217, 1220 (2010) ("In the one hundred plus years that the Supreme Court has addressed

ticulars, 39 WM.
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still remains integral to the underlying principles surrounding Tenth
Amendment concerns of maintaining at least some regulation for
states in areas where states traditionally operated. In situations such
as this, where the federal government and the states both have legitimate interests in regulating a particular industry, implied preemption tends to lend its hand in favor of the federal government's interest. However, this presumption supporting preemption should not be
so readily construed; instead, because the manufacturing of medical
devices covers multiple dimensions of commerce and consumer
health, the FDA should enlist these state-law claims to help carry out
its delegated duties, or Congress could enact legislation combining its
efforts with the states to aid in regulating this pervasive industry.
Thus, with the present frailty of the presumption against preemption, the question of whether state-tort common law claims can survive implied conflict preemption is ripe for debate. Courts have a duty to uphold this presumption because without it, federal law would
undoubtedly exceed its permissible scope and intrude on the inherent
authority of the states. Moreover, with regard to implied preemption,
many courts have taken an expansive view, extending the boundaries
to unimaginable ends. As noted above and discussed further below,
Buckman significantly influenced this view, but many lower courts
are now interpreting Buckman to apply to claims that should not be
impliedly preempted. To an extent, although Buckman holds otherwise, 3 7 state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims should not be impliedly
preempted because there is no inherent conflict between the federal
scheme and the numerous, complementary state-tort laws that are,
or at least once were, in place.
Evidently, both mechanisms can work together to disincentivize
manufacturers from attempting to submit potentially questionable
medical devices for approval, thus allowing the FDA to focus on legitimately safe, carefully designed, and meticulously studied devices the
public needs. If state law were paired with federal law in regulating
the manufacturing and marketing of medical devices, the end result
may include increased tort liability, which could inflate potential
damages awarded to an injured plaintiff to enormous amounts, thus
engendering and encouraging manufacturers to conduct strict, adequate, and reliable clinical studies before submitting devices for approval. 3 8 A manufacturer's duty of care under federal requirements

preemption issues, it has been inconsistent about the role that the presumption against
preemption plays.").
37. See infra Section II.C.
38. But see Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 623 (2010) ("[1]t is not clear how
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combined with complementary and parallel state-tort liability would
not add to or differ from such federal requirements, but would merely
provide an extra incentive for manufacturers to remain transparent
and accountable with the devices they seek to market to consumers.
III.

MANEUVERING THE LAW

For a plaintiffs state-tort common law claim to have a fighting
chance of withstanding a preemption defense, the plaintiff must carefully craft the complaint to fit the pleading standard set out in
Twombly and Iqbal,3 9 as well as fit the mold of the narrow "parallel"
claim set forth in In re Medtronic Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads.40 The
trilogy of cases that highlight how, when, and to what extent a statetort common law claim may survive a preemption defense is Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, and Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee.41 These cases intertwine with one another,
playing piggy-back with the analysis of certain issues; however,
Buckman is the only case in which the United States Supreme Court
has ruled on implied preemption of state-law fraud-on-the-FDA
claims.
A. Riegel
In Riegel, the plaintiff, Charles Riegel, received the Evergreen
Balloon Catheter, which was a full premarket approved Class III device that was manufactured by the defendant, Medtronic, Inc. 4 2 After
suffering an injury from the device, Riegel brought suit against Medtronic, alleging "that Medtronic's catheter was designed, labeled, and
manufactured in a manner that violated New York common law, and
that these defects caused Riegel to suffer severe and permanent injuries."4 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Second Circuit, barring Plaintiffs claims as preempted, stressing that:

strongly failure of regulation to prevent grossly inadequate care by a producer will correlate with a credible threat of a potentially ruinous tort suit.").
39. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding the plaintiff need
not plead specific facts to state a valid claim; the plaintiff must only plead enough facts to
prove the claim is "plausible on its face"); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009) (holding that a claim must "nudge [the injury] across the line from conceivable to plausible"
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
40. See In re Medtronic Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200,
1205-08 (8th Cir. 2010).
41. Riegel, 552 U.S. 312; Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001);
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470.
42. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320.
43. Ir.
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State requirements are pre-empted under the MDA only to the extent that they are "different from, or in addition to" the requirements imposed by federal law. § 360k(a)(1). Thus, § 360k does not
prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a
case "parallel," rather than add to, federal requirements. 44

Riegel's impact on implied preemption, however, is relatively minimal. 4 5 Riegel concerns a full premarket approved Class III device,
which suggests that if a Class III device undergoes full premarket
approval, the ability for a plaintiff to bring state-tort common law
claims against the manufacturer is very limited. 4 6 The main takeaway from Riegel is the notion of the "parallel" claim that allows
state-tort common law claims to potentially survive express
preemption. 4 7 However, an issue arises when a parallel state-tort
claim becomes subject to implied preemption, notwithstanding the
fact that it prevailed against the express preemption clause. 48 In
this situation, courts look to the complaint to determine its premise and if it tries to overstep the authority given to the FDA with
respect to regulating medical devices. 49
B. Lohr
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the plaintiff, Lora Lohr, was implanted
with a pacemaker device, which received approval through the 510(k)
process and was manufactured by the defendant, (again) Medtronic,
44. Id. at 330.
45. See Mark Hermann, David Booth Alden & Bradley W. Harrison, The Meaning of
the ParallelRequirements Exception Under Lohr and Riegel, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
545, 561 (2010) ("[Riegel] said nothing about the extent to which [parallel] claims may be
impliedly preempted.").
46. See Laverty v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
("Class III medical device manufacturers 'who subject their Class III medical devices to the
rigorous premarket approval process are protected by federal law from civil liability so long as
they comply with federal law.' " (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630
F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2010))); see also Demetria D. Frank-Jackson, The Medical Device Federal Preemption Trilogy: Salvaging Due Process for Injured Patients, 35 S. ILL. L.J. 453, 462
(2011) ("[P]remarket approved devices are subject to federal preemption protection.").

47. See In re Smith & Nephew Birmingham Hip Resurfacing (BHR) Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CCB-17-2775, 2018 WL 1471684, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2018) ("[A]
plaintiff may succeed on her state law claim by proving conduct that violates federal requirements . . . that claim parallels federal requirements. The state law reliance on a federal regulation need not be explicit." (emphasis added)).

48.

See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872-73 (2000) (noting that, alt-

hough "there is an 'inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-

emption,' " this does not extinguish the possibility of implied preemption ever applying in
the face of an express preemption provision (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S.

280, 289 (1995))).
49. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350.
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Inc.50 After implantation, the pacemaker failed, causing a "complete
heart block" in Lohr that required her to undergo emergency surgery
to fix the pacemaker. 5' Subsequently, Lohr filed suit against Medtronic, alleging negligence and strict liability claims. 5 2 The Supreme

Court held that none of the plaintiffs claims were preempted. 53 The
Court reasoned that if Medtronic's construction54 of section 360k was
upheld, medical device manufacturers would be granted "complete
immunity from design defect liability," and due to the industry's reputation and operations, there is no possible or plausible reason that
Congress "would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."5 5
The major takeaway from Lohr with regard to Class III medical
devices approved through the 510(k) process is "that pre-emption occur[s] only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest."5 6 However, the effects of Lohr
generated staggering inconsistencies with how lower courts interpret
and decide whether express preemption is applicable in a given
case.5 7 With regard to implied preemption, however, the Court gave
no indication or hint as to whether state law claims would be, or
could be, impliedly preempted. This silence begs the question how
state law claims that parallel, or even slightly add to, federal requirements threaten federal interests. If Congress' overall objective in
enacting the MDA was to increase the safety and regulation of medi50. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 480 (1996).
51. Id. at 481 ("According to her physician, a defect in the lead was the likely cause of
the failure.").
52. Id.
53. Id. at 503.
54. Medtronic argued that any state-tort common law cause of action is a state "requirement" that would explicitly violate the language of section 360k of 21 U.S.C.; therefore, "any and all common-law claims" should be preempted by the MDA. Id. at 486.
55. Id. at 487 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
56. Id. at 500; see also Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the "Crazy Quilt"of Cipollone: A Divided Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1453 (1997) ("[I]n order for preemption to occur, the FDA
regulation requires not only that the preempting FDA requirements be 'specific counterpart regulations . . . applicable to a particular device,' but also that the preempted state
requirements not be 'of general applicability.' " (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting FTC Credit Practices Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1996))).
57. Compare Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding
that because, inter alia, the device is a Class III medical device that received full premarket approval, thus setting out specific federal requirements for the device, the plaintiffs claims were expressly preempted), with Garross v. Medtronic, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d
809, 813, 815 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (holding that, notwithstanding the device being a Class III
device that received full premarket approval, none of plaintiffs state law claims were expressly preempted because they were all based on an "alleged underlying violation of federal law").
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cal devices, state-tort claims should improve this objective, not
threaten it.5 8 The end goal is the same for both means of regulation:

to ensure medical devices are safe and that they achieve maximum
consumer safety.
C. Buckman
The focal point of this Note and the opinion that opened the door
for widespread application of implied preemption barring state-tort
common law claims is Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'Legal Committee.5 9
In Buckman, the plaintiffs sustained spinal injuries from orthopedic
bone screws placed in the pedicles of their spines.6 0 The plaintiffs alleged that when the manufacturer of the bone screws submitted the
screws for premarket approval, it made fraudulent representations to
the FDA as to the device's intended use. 6 ' The Supreme Court held
that "[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 'a field which
the States have traditionally occupied,'" and thus preemption is warranted because a state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claim inevitably conflicts with federal law. 6 2 The Supreme Court further stated:
The conflict stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme
amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the
Administration, and that this authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives.
The balance sought by the Administration can be skewed by allow63
ing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law.

However, as pointed out by Justice Stevens in his concurrence, the
majority's holding eliminates any and all potential remedies an injured consumer may seek against a fraudulent manufacturer. 6 4 Although the MDA are to be enforced solely by the federal government,
there is no plausible argument that Congress envisioned these
amendments to basically gift medical device manufacturers with

58. Particularly, if a state-tort claim alleges a manufacturer's breach of duty owed to a
consumer-such as a state law requiring proper care in manufacturing medical devicesand this duty is not specifically owed to the FDA because it predates the MDA, the claim
should not be impliedly preempted because it rests on traditionally state-regulated domains. Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1330 (11th Cir. 2017).
59. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
60. Id. at 343.
61. Id. The bone screws received 510(k) approval. Id. at 346.
62. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
63. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348.
64. See id. at 355 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Under the [Court's] pre-emption analysis . . . parties injured by fraudulent representations to federal agencies would have no
remedy even if recognizing such a remedy would have no adverse consequences upon the
operation or integrity of the regulatory process.").
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complete immunity in tort suits. 6 5 Further, while "the FDCA provides
the FDA 'a variety of enforcement options that allow it to make a
measured response to suspected fraud upon the Administration,' "66
as discussed below, state-tort fraud-on-the-FDA claims merely complement, rather than inhibit or impede, federal law in the regulation
of medical devices. Thus, this suggested "variety of enforcement options" can be supplemented by state-tort law that is aimed at improving and enhancing the federal scheme as a whole for the sole purpose
of protecting consumers.
Overall, Buckman bars any and all claims that attempt to question
the "legitimacy of FDA actions."6 7 Arguably, though, state-tort claims
that seek to ensure that manufacturers are being truthful to the FDA
are not out to question the FDA's practices and regulations; that is,
plaintiffs, presumably, do not think the FDA is in the wrong. Rather,
many claims simply try to uncover remedies for injuries caused by
defective devices. Such claims also seek to improve consumer safety
and assist the FDA in achieving its goals set out through the MDA by
highlighting and remedying potential manufacturer fraud and dishonesty. If the FDA were to utilize such claims and impose this "second layer" of protection for the consumer-or rather, this additional
incentive to the manufacturer to adequately study their products before submitting their application for approval-the FDA would have
greater confidence that they are approving the safest and most efficacious devices for consumers.

D.

Circuit Split

Circuits across the country face unparalleled uncertainty when
tasked with determining whether federal law preempts parallel
state-tort common law claims against medical device manufacturers
of Class III medical devices.6 8 The Court in Buckman even noted that

65. Id.; 2 JAMES T. O'REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION § 26:81, at 1 (4th ed. 2017).
66. JAMES T. O'REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION § 26:81, at 12 (4th ed. 2017) (quoting Buckman, 531 U.S. at 349).
67. James M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-Liability Litigation: Where We Are and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 657, 703 (2009).
68. See Jarett Sena, "The Contours of the Parallel Claim Exception: The Supreme
Court's Opportunity to Define the Ill-defined," 42 FORD. URB. L.J. 291, 320 (2014) ("The
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have adopted an expansive view of Buckman to impliedly
preempt traditional state law tort claims premised on FDA violations. By contrast, the
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have limited Buckman's scope to fraud-on-the-FDA
claims, thereby allowing traditional state law tort claims premised on FDA violations to avoid
implied preemption."); see also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, NavigatingBetween Scylla and Charybdis: Preemption of Medical Device 'Parallel Claims," 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 159,
172 (2013) ("Although ...
courts often clearly set out the principles articulated by the Su-
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their decision would "resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals" on
the question of whether "fraud claims were . . . expressly [or] impliedly pre-empted."" However, Buckman was decided in 2001 and Riegel
was decided in 2008. As seen throughout this Note, many lower
courts tried to figure out the state of the law between 2001 and 2008,
and now, uncertainty remains as to the question of whether a plaintiffs state law claim squeezes through the "narrow gap" created by
Riegel and Buck man.7 0

1.

The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits

'

The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits properly sustained the notion
of a presumption against preemption, thus allowing plaintiffs to plead
state-tort claims that might otherwise be subject to preemption.7
First, the Fifth Circuit in Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp. held
that the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim was not preempted "to the
extent that it [was] based on [the defendant's] violation of applicable
FDA regulations requiring accurate reporting of serious injuries and
malfunctions of the . . . device."72 The court in Hughes also noted that
implied preemption was not warranted because, unlike the plaintiffs
in Buckman, 73 the plaintiffs here asserted a "recognized state tort
claim," which Buckman did not foreclose. 7 4

preme Court, distinguishing express and implied preemption, their analyses are less
clear.").
69. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001).
70. In re Medtronic Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204
(8th Cir. 2010); see also Neil M. Issar, Note, Preemption of State Law Claims Involving
Medical Devices: Why Increasing Liabilityfor Manufacturers is a Perilous but PivotalProposition, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1085, 1094 (2015) ("Instead of narrowing the scope of
Buckman's implied preemption and Riegel's express preemption, a circuit split has
emerged regarding the narrow 'gap' through which a plaintiffs claims can escape both
implied and express preemption.").
71. See Sena, supra note 68, at 320.
72. Hughes v. Boston Sci. Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 771 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Bass v.
Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that if the plaintiff pleads that
the manufacturer "failed to comply with either the [premarket approval requirements] or
the CGMVPs themselves and that this failure caused the injury, the plaintiff will have
pleaded a parallel claim"). See Sena, supranote 68, at 318 (noting that the court in Hughes
found that "the plaintiffs state law failure-to-warn claim premised on [medical device reporting requirement] was not preempted").
73. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347-49 (noting the plaintiffs here asserted a claim that
rested solely on a violation of federal law, and without such federal regulations, the claim
would not exist).
74. Hughes, 631 F.3d at 775; see also Eggen, supra note 68, at 186 ("The Fifth
Circuit . . . distinguished [general failure-to-warn] claims from the 'fraud-on-the-FDA'
claim asserted in Buckman, stating that the latter was "a freestanding federal cause
of action.").
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Next, the Seventh Circuit in Bausch v. Stryker Corp. held, inter
alia, that the plaintiffs' state law claims were neither expressly nor
impliedly preempted so long as they rested on a violation of federal
law.75 Further, Bausch laid out the foundation for the proposition
that a plaintiffs claim need only allege a manufacturer's violation of
federal law.76 Consequently, a state-tort fraud-on-the-FDA claimthat is, a blatant violation of federal law-would survive implied
preemption as well.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc. held that
the MDA did not preempt the plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn
claim "insofar as the state-law duty parallels a federal-law duty under the MDA."7 7 The Court noted that even if the standard for a par-

allel claim were more precise in this situation, the plaintiffs' claim
would still survive because the applicable state law "contemplates a
warning to a third party such as the FDA,"7 8 and the plaintiffs al-

leged that the manufacturer failed to warn the FDA of adverse
events.7 9

'

Overall, these three circuits have set the stage for upholding the
presumption against preemption-which is currently begging for a
life raft. All of these circuits heed the suggestion that state-tort common law claims that parallel federal law will survive both express
and implied preemption, even if the state-tort claim rests on a manufacturer's breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff to be truthful and
transparent.s Presumably, these three circuits might also heed the
suggestion that fraud-on-the-FDA claims do not necessarily conflict
with federal law, but rather complement it to a degree that only
boosts the efficiency of the FDA as a whole in regulating and policing
fraud.8
75. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 556, 558 (7th Cir. 2010). But see McMullen
v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs claim for
post-sale failure to warn was preempted because section 814.39 of 21 C.F.R. does not require a manufacturer to provide "interim supplemental warnings pending approval by the
FDA," thus the claim added "additional" requirements and was preempted); see also Sena,
supranote 68, at 326.
76. Bausch, 630 F.3d at 552-53, 559.
77. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1226; see also Sena, supra note 68, at 326-27.
80. David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV.
411, 434 (2004).
81. See, e.g., Sena, supra note 68, at 352 ("Another reason to attach the presumption
against preemption is the need for state-law claims to complement FDA enforcement actions. . . . [S]tate-law tort claims are needed to make up for the deficiencies in the FDA
post-market surveillance process."); Tarloff, supra note 23, at 1224 ("Parallel claims based
on violations of the FDA's industry-wide regulations can complement the FDA's efforts in
all of [their] endeavors.").
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The Sixth and Eighth Circuits

"

On the other end of the spectrum, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
have staunchly overemphasized the authority of the MDA's express
preemption provision8 2 and the scope of implied preemption. 8 3 Both of
these circuits have ruled in favor of sustaining, and arguably expanding, the scope and force of federal preemption in this realm. For instance, the Sixth Circuit in Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. held that "permitting a fraud claim premised on false representations to the FDA
during the [premarket approval] process would conflict with wellestablished precedent that no implied private right of action exists
under the FDCA." 8 4 However, this analysis seems misplaced; a claim
premised on false representations to the FDA during the premarket
approval process does not create a private cause of action, but rather
it highlights a manufacturer's violation of the federal requirementsusually found in the Code of Federal Regulations-imposed under the
premarket approval process, which the federal government seeks to
police. The Sixth Circuit maintained this broad scope of implied
preemption in Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc." Here, the court preempted,
inter alia, the plaintiffs' state law "post-sale 'failure to warn'
claim, 8 6 holding that the plaintiffs' assertion that the defendants had
"duties 'independent of any obligations .. . to comply with applicable
federal requirements,' " were still " 'in addition to' [or even different
from] federal requirements," and were thus preempted. In Cupek,
the "additional" duties involved manufacturers reporting updated
information regarding a specific device to the FDA, which a manufacturer is required to do under federal law.88 As stated throughout, this
82. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012).
83. See Sena, supra note 68, at 320 ("The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have adopted an
expansive view of Buckman to impliedly preempt traditional state law tort claims premised
on FDA violations.").
84. Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 236 (6th Cir. 2000); see also 21 U.S.C. § 337(a)
(2012). The MDA provides that "all actions to enforce FDA requirements 'shall be by and in
the name of the United States.' " In re Medtronic Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab.
Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 337(a)); cf. Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 Fed App'x 436 (6th Cir. 2010). In Howard, the Sixth Circuit was
faced with deciding whether state requirements of a medical device paralleled federal requirements, specifically the "Current Good Manufacturing Practices." Id. at 439. While this
case does not concern a private right of action or false misrepresentations, the court nonetheless held that "if the FDA may require a manufacturer to keep a device oil-free [the
issue in the case], a state may provide a damages remedy for violations of an identical state
requirement." Id. at 441. This lends support to not only claims overcoming express preemption, but implied preemption as well.
85. 405 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2005).
86. Id. at 422.
87. Id. at 425.
88. See id. at 424.
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scheme should be viewed as a mechanism to support federal law, not
as a hinderance or obstacle to it. While these state laws might be
viewed as "double-dipping" in tort law, thus chilling innovation and
deterring the creation of potentially life-saving devices, one cannot
disagree that this scheme could serve as an incentive to manufacturers to expend appropriate resources to adequately research and test
these devices before sending them to market.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit in In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint
Fidelis Leads held that all of the plaintiffs' claims were preempted,"
either due to a failure to plead a parallel claim or due to the prohibition of private parties attempting to enforce the MDA.o The court
focused on the fact that the plaintiffs pled claims that amounted to "a
frontal assault on the FDA's decision to approve a [premarket approval] Supplement after weighing the product's benefits against its
inherent risks."9 ' However, similar to Kemp, where the Sixth Circuit
misplaced its focus on one's inability to bring a private right of action,
the Eighth Circuit failed to analyze the plaintiffs' claims outside of
the Riegel framework, essentially affirming the notion that medical
device manufacturers can escape liability if their products obtain full
premarket approval.9 2

These decisions are perverse to the whole notion of tort liability;
manufacturers in many industries-particularly, manufacturers of
medical devices-have the potential to produce intrinsically dangerous products, and the idea that they could receive judicial immunity
from potential lawsuits simply because their products went through
the FDA's most stringent approval process-the premarket approval
process-is threatening to both the regulatory scheme and to the
remedies available for consumers who are genuinely harmed by medical devices. 9 3 Additionally, it should be noted that this analysisthat of the Sixth and Eight Circuits-concerns cases involving devic89. See Tarloff, supra note 23, at 1211 ("[T]he court ... found all of the Sprint Fidelis
plaintiffs' claims either expressly or impliedly preempted.").
90. In re Medtronic Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads, 623 F.3d at 1205-07.
91. Id. at 1207.
92. Issar, supra note 70, at 1099; see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333
(2008) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's interpretation of the MDA pardons medical device manufacturers from liability "once the application for the design or
label has gained premarket approval from the [FDA]"); see Charles Warren, When the Feds
Have Taken the Field: Federal Field Preemption of Claims Against Manufacturers Whose
Medical Devices Have Received Premarket Approval by the FDA, 9 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 65
(2013) ("Viewed from the [Sixth Circuit's] perspective, when a device passes the FDA's
rigorous PMA standards, it reaches the pinnacle of what may be required of it in terms of
safety.").
93. See Issar, supra note 70, at 1099 ("Such unqualified immunity for manufacturers
is improper in the medical device context; medical devices are inherently risky and no approval process can guarantee perfect safety.").
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es that obtained full premarket approval; the current state of the
less-intensive 510(k) approval process is foggy, 9 4 but precedent suggests that devices approved through this process are more susceptible
to state-tort liability.9 5 While the express preemption provision applies to both full premarket approved medical devices and devices
approved through the 510(k) process,96 after Buckman, courts have
been inconsistent in determining whether implied preemption applies equally to both as well. The cases discussed above do not elaborate on the implications of implied preemption as applied to 510(k)approved devices.97
Further, neither of these circuits ventured to analyze or explain
the impact of implied preemption on parallel state-tort common law
claims.98 Buckman failed to address this issue as well,99 and it seems
that some courts are taking this silence as approval to apply implied
preemption on parallel state-tort claims, especially failure-to-warn
and fraud-like claims.' 00 However, this assumption may be misplaced.
94. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); see also supra
Part II.
95. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 776 F.3d
1035 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 109 F.3d 1243, 1245 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that the state-tort claim of negligence brought against a device approved
through the FDA's less rigorous process, known as the "investigational device exemption,"
was not expressly or impliedly preempted).
96. Joyce B. Margarce & Michelle R. Scheiffele, Is the Preemption Defense for PMApproved Medical Devices in Jeopardy?, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 14 (2008) ("The express
preemption provision applies to devices that enter the market through both the [premarket
approval] and § 510(k) processes.").
97. In re Medtronic Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204
(8th Cir. 2010); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000).
98. See In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads, 623 F.3d at 1204-07; Kemp, 231
F.3d at 222 (noting that where Congress has explicitly spoken to the precise question at
issue, like the express preemption provision in the MDA, the court has no reason to consider implied preemption).
99. One commentator noted that if Buckman did in fact concern a full premarket approved device, then "fraud-on-the-FDA claims [would] appear to be parallel requirements
claims under Lohr and Riegel. They would 'provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties [that] parallel federal requirements;' namely the federal requirements that require manufacturers to provide the FDA with truthful and complete
data when seeking PMA approval." See Hermann et al., supra note 45, at 570 (quoting
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996)).
100. See, e.g., Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1174 (S.D.
Cal. 2016) (holding that although the FDA did not consider a particular risk associated
with the medical device when evaluating the device's warning, that fact does not bar the
court from applying implied (conflict) preemption to the plaintiffs claims); Enlow v. St.
Jude Med., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 853, 860 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (holding that the plaintiffs failure-to-warn claim was preempted "to the extent that ...
[the] claim is premised on the
adequacy of the warnings reviewed and approved by the FDA"); see also Sena, supra note
68, at 321 ("Like the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, various district courts have expanded
Buckman beyond fraud-on-the FDA to impliedly preempt traditional state law tort
claims.").
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Silence does not equal permission, and the consequences stemming
from courts that take this silence as permission could prove to be detrimental to state-tort liability.
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

FDA

AND STATE-TORT CLAIMS

At first glance, the relationship between the FDA and state-tort
claims would tend to cast doubt on the presumption against preemption due to the agency's regulatory scheme and its protections as applied to manufacturers. This doubt can be overcome, however, if the
FDA were to use such claims to its advantage. With regard to the issue of implied conflict preemption and the arguments in favor of expanding the scope and use of implied preemption in the context of
medical devices, it should be noted that state-tort common law claims
do not actually hinder or conflict with the federal scheme that regulates medical devices. Regardless of whether a particular device received full premarket approval or approval through the 510(k) process, "fraud-on-the-FDA" claims only aim to improve the federal
scheme and maintain transparency between the manufacturer and
the consumer. Arguably, state-tort claims that "[p]olic[e] fraud
against federal agencies" seek to monitor the manufacturer itself, not
the agency.'' Therefore, Buckman and its progeny misunderstand
the relationship between the FDA and state-tort common law claims
brought by injured plaintiffs seeking recourse. For example, in In re
Medtronic, Inc., Implantable Defibrillators Litigation,'o the court
noted:
[A]

manufacturer's knowing failure to disclose its own positive

knowledge of danger hidden in an approved medical device has its
own effect: the company's failure to exhibit absolute probity could be
found to have knowingly deprived the FDA of information needed to
confer its approval for the device to be implanted in humans.' 0 3

Thus, in order to allow the FDA to strongly incentivize manufacturers against participating in deceptive practices and techniques, statetort law can serve as a second line of defense to aid the FDA in identifying and deterring manufacturer malfeasance.
With multiple arguments supporting the position that state-tort
liability must acquiesce to federal law and regulation,' 0 4 it should be
emphasized that consumer protection is the FDA's first priority:
101. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001).
102. In re Medtronic, Inc., Implantable Defibrillators Litig. 465 F. Supp. 2d 886 (D.
Minn. 2006).
103. Id. at 900-01.
104. Proponents of preemption of state-tort claims argue that claims similar to "fraudon-the-FDA" would impose undue burdens on medical device manufacturers and the FDA
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FDA's view is that FDA product approval and state tort liability
usually operate independently, each providing a significant, yet
distinct, layer of consumer protection. FDA regulation of a device
cannot anticipate and protect against all safety risks to individual
consumers. Even the most thorough regulation of a product such
as a critical medical device may fail to identify potential problems
presented by the product. Regulation cannot protect against all
possible injuries that might result from use of a device over time.
Preemption of all such claims would result in the loss of a significant layer of consumer protection, leaving consumers without a
5
remedy for injuries caused by defective medical devices.o

This highlights the concern expressed by Justice Ginsberg's dissent
in Riegel and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp. that "[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by
illegal conduct."0 6 This is another justification for the assertion that
state-tort fraud-on-the-FDA claims complement, rather than impede
or conflict with, federal law. It is actually difficult to see how "conflicting" state requirements-such as requirements of a warning label or requirements involving continued reporting on the device to
the FDA, would hinder or impede a federal law from achieving its
objectives. It is easier to see how it might be difficult (and impractical) for a manufacturer to try to draft a warning label to fit all fifty
states' requirements, but this is exactly why the federal government
should step in to create a federal requirement that respects differing
state laws and attempts to reconcile them into a coherent, universally known, and consistently applied labeling requirement. As stated
above,' 7 such state requirements-which essentially require the
same conduct from the manufacturer as federal law-might better
incentivize manufacturers to adequately research and test a device
before submitting its application to the FDA. This "side-kick" 08 state
law would, in essence, assist the FDA in policing potential malfeasance or fraud on the part of the manufacturer.
itself because such claims would incentivize "manufacturers to submit documents to avoid
fraud-on-the-FDA liability . . . during the premarket approval process," and these claims
would significantly impede the agency's ability to get beneficial products on the market by
subjecting it to "the discovery process." See Tarloff, supra note 23, at 1226-27.
105. Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decisions: FDA Perspective and Position, 52
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997).
106. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 266 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting another source); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337 (2008)
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Sena, supra note 68, at 349; supra note 55 and accom-

panying text.
107.

See supra text accompanying note 88.

108. I use the term "side-kick" to denote a Batman-and-Robin-type relationship, with
Batman exemplifying federal law and Robin exemplifying state law.
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Additionally, state-tort fraud-on-the-FDA claims can be construed
as claims that rest on both traditional state law and federal regulations. While Buckman clarifies that claims cannot rest solely on federal law,' 09 these state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims arguably rest on
both federal law and traditional state-tort law. Manufacturers have
always had a duty to be honest and transparent with whatever entity
governs it, whether it is the traditional state law that governed before the enactment of the MDA or federal regulations imposed by the
FDA." 0 As such, regardless of which body authoritatively regulates
medical device manufacturers, these fraud-on-the-FDA claims find
their roots in both state and federal law. For example, a plaintiff
brings a claim against a manufacturer alleging that the manufacturer failed to conform to the standards governing its operations by
submitting allegedly fraudulent information to the FDA."' This type
of claim rests on the federal regulations governing how manufacturers must comply with the FDA's regulatory and reporting standards.
This claim may also rest on the state-tort law of negligence for failing
to take reasonable care in studying the device and submitting accurate information for approval. Thus, if courts are to follow Buckman's
analysis, the injured consumer would have no available avenues for
recourse and the manufacturer would likely get off scot-free and act
with impunity. This result would seem counterintuitive to the intent
behind not only the MDA but the preapproval process as well.
Furthermore, although federal preemption has a valid and legitimate place in numerous areas of governmental regulation-such as
immigration-federal preemption of state-tort common law claims
against medical device manufacturers should not be so robust that it
impossibly limits consumers from pleading claims after an incurring
an actual injury-in-fact. This is not to say that federal preemption in
this realm should not exist; rather, it should not be as pervasive. An
analysis of the differences between these two areas of regulation
might provide useful reasoning and justification for the assertion
that federal preemption should not be as wide-sweeping as it currently is with medical devices.
With regard to immigration, Arizona v. United States gives a particularly definitive explanation of why federal preemption is necessary in this realm. In Arizona, the State of Arizona enacted a statute
109. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).
110. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.45 (2017) ("[The] FDA may deny approval of a [premarket
approved device] . . . [if] [t]he [premarket approval application] contains a false statement
of material fact."); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 460 (4th Cir. 1960)
("[T]he [FDCA] imposes an absolute duty on manufacturers not to misbrand their products
[in this case a surgical nail], and the breach of this duty may give rise to civil liability.").
111. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. 814.20 (2017); 21 C.F.R. 803.10 (2017).
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to address the issue of illegal aliens within the state." 2 This statute
aimed to "discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the
United States."11 3 The question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether federal law preempts multiple provisions of Arizona's statute.11 4 The Court held that three of the provisions at issue were
preempted, and the Court reasoned, inter alia, that the federal government "has significant power to regulate immigration," and although "Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration . .. the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law."" 5 Thus, Arizona's statute that

gave state officers the power and authority to "decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable .

.

. violates the principle

that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal
Government.""

6

The decision in Arizona on implied preemption is analogous to the
regulation of medical devices in that the Supreme Court held in both
situations that state law that protrudes into the realm of federal regulation and either impedes or has the potential to impede the federal
scheme will be preempted. However, immigration, which has traditionally been regulated by the federal government, is an incredibly
broad and national issue that expands across multiple levels of policy, including domestic and foreign relations. Medical devices, on the
other hand, were traditionally regulated by the states." 7 This fact
warrants deference and respect to state-tort common law claims
when such claims share the same goal and purpose as federal law,
notwithstanding the fact that these devices are marketed and sold
both nationally and globally. The strongest argument in favor of allowing state assistance to medical device regulation is that it does
not seem likely that the federal scheme will encounter hindrances or
impediments by enforcing and recognizing state-tort fraud-on-theFDA claims. The federal regulatory scheme does not lose its power or
credibility if state-tort liability serves as a companion to the FDA's
authority to police fraud and tortious misconduct. If anything, such
additional and complementary police power would enhance the FDA's
function and operation by allowing the FDA to use its limited time
112. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 392-3 (2012).
113. Id. at 393 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 n. (2012)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 416; The Court also noted that "[b]y ...
authorizing state and local officers
to engage in . . . enforcement activities as a general matter, [the statute] creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 410.
116. Id. at 409.
117. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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and resources more efficiently at the premarket approval stage, rather than utilizing such resources after a device has been approved.
Presumably, fraud is more likely to present itself at the premarket
approval stage because manufacturers want to start selling their
products quickly.
For example, if an injured plaintiff discovered evidence of a medical device manufacturer's misrepresentations to the FDA regarding
either preapproval or post-approval studies and reports, but the state
in which the plaintiff brought suit did not have a "parallel" requirement for her claim to stand on, the manufacturer would essentially
escape liability if the FDA either did not credit the discovered evidence or did not believe the evidence would affect the approval status
of the device in question. (The latter seems more likely to be the
case.) This is where state-tort fraud-on-the-FDA claims would step in
and aid the federal scheme of policing fraud and ensuring that medical device manufacturers create the safest and most effective devices
available to the public. Such claims do not add to or differ from" 8 the
federal scheme, and they do not inherently conflict with federal regulations; they actually enhance the system in such a way that allows
the FDA to accurately and confidently identify and address manufacturer malfeasance, while still maintaining the necessary autonomy
for manufacturers to design, study, and market innovative medical
devices.
The Court in Buckman, along with many lower courts, seemed to
believe that fraud-on-the-FDA claims target the FDA itself and its
alleged failure to uncover manufacturer wrongdoing."' However, this
may not be the case with such claims. These state-law claims, similar
to negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims, target the manufacturer and its allegedly unlawful conduct. The end goal is not to punish or chide the FDA; it is to uncover manufacturer wrongdoings and
assist the FDA in addressing and remedying such wrongdoings in the
aftermath of consumer injury. While negligent misrepresentation
and fraud claims generally rest on traditional state law, irrespective
20
of the FDCA,o
state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims hold identical
purposes and should not be disallowed due to their perceived status
as allowing a private right of action against the FDA. While the MDA
does not offer or permit a private right of action, this is not the case
with fraud-on-the-FDA claims. Such claims arise from the manufac-

118. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
119. See supra notes 62-63 & 66 and accompanying text.
120. See Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1227 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding
that the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation claims
were not impliedly preempted because they "exist independently" from the FDCA).
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turer's duty owed to the consumer when it submits a device for approval to the FDA.121 This duty encompasses the assurance that, if
approved and offered to consumers, the device is safe, efficacious, and
tirelessly studied. Therefore, such claims could arguably stand on
any independent state law involving a manufacturer's basic duty of
care. However, even if these claims cannot find support in traditional
state-tort law, the fact that these claims rest solely on federal law
should not preclude the consumer from at least bringing sufficient
evidence of potential manufacturer malfeasance to the FDA for them
to investigate.
Nevertheless, in light of this vexed position, the Supreme Court's
holding in Buckman made this argument susceptible to attack on the
grounds that only the FDA itself has the authority to determine how
it will handle issues of fraud and any attempt to aid that authority is
an encroachment on the Agency.' 2 2 Buckman furthers the notion that
the balance of statutory objectives that the FDA seeks to achieve "can
be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort
law." 2 3 The Court also emphasized the potential undue burden
placed on medical device manufacturers if state-law fraud-on-theFDA claims were to succeed; specifically, the Court feared the
chilling effect on "off-label" use of medical devices and the influx of
potentially unnecessary information that manufacturers would give
to the FDA.1 2 4 Buckman also classified fraud-on-the-FDA claims as
"freestanding federal cause[s] of action based on violation[s] of the
FDA's regulations," not traditional state-tort duties.'2 5 Thus, Buckman aids in understanding the "narrow gap" a plaintiff must plead
for a state-tort claim to survive.'2
However, as discussed above, such claims should not be analyzed
as resting solely on violations of federal requirements, thus serving
as a private right of action. Rather, fraud-on-the-FDA claims should
be interpreted as complementary authoritative agents that assist the
FDA in ensuring manufacturers remain honest and produce safe and
effective medical devices. With a similar mindset, the Ninth Circuit
in Stengel held that the state (Arizona) recognized a duty placed on
121. See supra Section I.D.1.
122. Buckman Co. v. Plainitffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 350; see Issar, supra note 70, at 1113 (noting that proponents of federal
preemption argue that tort law "over-deter[s] manufacturers" by adding a layer of cautionary discretion concerning the creation of new medical devices that consumers actually
need).
125. Hughes v. Boston Sci. Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775 (5th Cir. 2011); Buckman, 531 U.S.
at 353.
126. See supra Part I.
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manufacturers to warn third parties of known adverse events, as well
as those that reasonably should be known.'2 7 Stengel noted that
"[u]nder Arizona law, a warning to a third party satisfies a manufacturer's duty if, given the nature of the warning and the relationship
of the third party, there is 'reasonable assurance that the information
will reach those whose safety depends on their having it.' "128
Therefore, the argument presented here is that a state-tort common law claim of fraud-on-the-FDA does not usurp the power of the
FDA or the federal government by giving a plaintiff a private right of
action. Rather, such claims stem from the overarching desire of both
state and federal law to ensure the safety and efficacy of medical devices and to ensure that medical device manufacturers comply with
complementary and parallel laws. As noted by one commentator,
"parallel claims based on violations of FDA industry-wide requirements, far from interfering with the FDA's enforcement decision
making, should strengthen the FDA's position. "129 Engaging in this
viewpoint-notwithstanding its sole focus resting on parallel claims
instead of fraud-on-the-FDA claims-it would seem obvious that the
FDA, by recruiting state-tort law (either recognizing parallel claims,
fraud-on-the-FDA claims, or both), could maximize its capabilities in
regulating this industry while serving the interests of the consumer.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit in Bausch provides a similar
analysis of state-tort claims that do not necessarily rest on explicit
state law but still warrant attention.1 3 0 The Seventh Circuit was
tasked with deciding whether a medical device alleged to be "adulterated" was impliedly preempted because "no state tort duty to
manufacture a product that is not adulterated" existed.13' The Court
held:
The MDA defines an "adulterated" device as a device "not in conformi-

ty with applicable requirements or conditions." 21 U.S.C. § 351(h).
While there may not be a "traditional state tort law" claim for an
"adulterated" product in so many words, the federal definition of
adulterated medical devices is tied directly to the duty of manufacturers to avoid foreseeable dangers with their products by complying with federal law. The evidence showing a violation of federal

127. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Arizona law
contemplates a warning to a third party such as the FDA.").
128. Id. (quoting Anguiano v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 808 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D.
Ariz. 1992)). But see Littlebear v. Advanced Bionics, LLC, 896 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1092 (N.D.
Okla. 2012) (holding that "adverse event reporting requirements are not substantive safety
requirements under state law, but rather administrative requirements").
129. See Tarloff, supra note 23, at 1225.
130. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 557 (7th Cir. 2010).
131. Id.
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law shows that the device is adulterated and goes a long way toward showing that the manufacturer breached a duty under state
law toward the patient.1 32

This reasoning suggests that some courts may be persuaded by arguments in favor of state-tort liability, notwithstanding the absence
of a foundation resting on traditional state-tort law.
While the arguments against allowing such claims are valid, as
Buckman highlights, they do not reach the level of concern that warrants the disabling of state-tort claims. David A. Kessler 33 and David
C. Vladeck 34 proffered their opinions on the strength of the FDA's
regulatory regime, concluding that "the FDA's efforts to restrict or
eliminate the complementary discipline placed on the market by failure-to-warn litigation" are highly questionable.1 35 They further explain that "the FDA is wrong to focus on the moment of approval as
determinative of the preemption question. . . . [Because] [a]t the time
of approval, the FDA's knowledge-base . . . is . . . highly limited be-

cause, at that point, the drug has been tested on a relatively small
population of patients." 3 6 Finally, Kessler and Vladeck contend that
"the tort system has historically provided important information
about . . . [post-approval] risks to physicians, patients, and the

FDA." 3 7 With this as a backdrop, fraud-on-the FDA claims do not
inherently conflict with federal law, nor do they "hijack the FDA's
enforcement decisions ."38 Such claims-though premised entirely on
the existence of federal requirements, thus lacking a foundation root132. Id.
133. David A. Kessler was the Commissioner of the FDA from 1990 to 1997. See David A.
Kessler, MD., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/History/FOrgsHistory/
Leaders/ucm093724.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/FA7K-7BB2].
134. David C. Viadek was the Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Consumer Protection from 2009 to 2012. See David C. Viadek, GEORGETOWN LAW,
https://www.law.georgetown.edulfaculty/david-vladeck/ [https://perma.cclJK53-SX34].
135. David A. Kessler & David C. Viadeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts
to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 465 (2008). Kessler and Viadeck's
article examined the FDA's role in regulating pharmaceutical drugs, but the analysis can
be applied almost identically to medical devices due to the similarities in their regulatory
schemes. See also Issar, supra note 70, at 1113 ("[R]ecent history suggests that the FDA
does not have adequate time, capacity, or resources to monitor manufacturers to ensure
that their post-market conduct complies with safety requirements; to perform the necessary cost-benefit analysis to determine when enforcement actions are appropriate; or to
pursue legal actions against manufacturers when doing so would be efficient.").
136. Kessler & Viadeck, supra note 134, at 465-66.
137. Id. at 466; see also Tarloff, supra note 23, at 1225-26 ("Private litigation against
manufacturers brings an inflow of private capital from litigants and results in information
disclosures through the discovery process. These features of private litigation have led
many to describe the tort system as a critical 'catalyst' for public enforcement." (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005))).
138. Tarloff, supra note 23, at 1228.

20181

PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION

887

ed in state-tort law-possess the same purposes of traditional statetort law and would, as stated above, allow the FDA to focus its resources and utilize them more efficiently in the premarket approval
process.
Furthermore, these types of claims do not "hijack" any decisions
authoritatively given to the FDA because they encompass the same
types of decisions the FDA would make regardless. If the FDA knew
of any fraudulent practices by a manufacturer, it would presumably
seek to enjoin the manufacturer from continuing such practices and
take the necessary steps to ameliorate any negative impacts stemming from the manufacturer's fraud, which should inherently include
allowing an injured plaintiff to seek recourse. Allowing state-tort
fraud-on-the-FDA claims to survive preemption would not impose
requirements "different from, or in addition to" 3 9 federal requirements, nor would it detract from the federal scheme of regulating
medical device manufacturers. Instead, it would only enhance the
system as a whole and incentivize manufacturers to create safe and
beneficial products expediently, with the added incentive of ensuring
that premarket and post-approval studies and reports are honest,
timely, and equitable to both the FDA and the consumer.
V. CONCLUSION

It is of no doubt that medical device manufacturers have crafted
and marketed vital, necessary, and life-saving devices that the public
needs. However, due to the inherent volatile nature of courts' interpretations of the MDA, it seems an opportune time for the Supreme
Court to inject itself into this discussion once again to smooth out the
wrinkles that are present within this doctrine and jurisprudence.
Medical device regulation needs uniform application and consistency
in its analytical framework. With states previously controlling such
regulation, deference and credence should be afforded to state-tort
laws that parallel federal law, and state-tort laws that complement
the federal scheme by serving its interest in a parallel way, such as
fraud-on-the-FDA claims. Thus, courts should find that state-law
fraud-on-the-FDA claims are not impliedly preempted because they
do not inhibit the federal scheme, nor do they commandeer the police
power of the FDA.

139.

21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2012).
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